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Abstract
One of the neural structures more often implicated in the processing of emotional signals 
in the absence of visual awareness is the amygdala. In this chapter, we review current 
evidence from human neuroscience in healthy and brain-damaged patients on the role of 
amygdala during non-conscious (visual) perception of emotional stimuli. Nevertheless, 
there is as of yet no consensus on the limits and conditions that affect the extent of 
amygdala’s response without focused attention or awareness. We propose to distin-
guish between attentional unawareness, a condition wherein the stimulus is potentially 
accessible to enter visual awareness but fails to do so because attention is diverted, and 
sensory unawareness, in which the stimulus fails to enter awareness because its normal 
processing in the visual cortex is suppressed. Within this conceptual framework, some 
of the apparently contradictory findings seem to gain new coherence and converge on 
the role of the amygdala in supporting different types of non-conscious emotion process-
ing. Amygdala responses in the absence of awareness are linked to different functional 
mechanisms and are driven by more complex neural networks than commonly assumed. 
Acknowledging this complexity can be helpful to foster new studies on amygdala func-
tions without awareness and their impact on human behaviour.
Keywords: blindsight, hemispatial neglect, subcortical, superior colliculus, pulvinar, 
attention, consciousness
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1. Introduction
The amygdala (Amg) is a composite subcortical structure that comprises more than 12 sub-
nuclei having distinctive patterns of input-output connections with the rest of the brain [1, 2]. 
This histological and connectional heterogeneity reflects its multifaceted functions. In fact, 
the Amg has long been known to have a central role in the processing of emotions, but it also 
serves as an interface between emotion and cognitive functions, including decision-making, 
learning and attention [3, 4]. Over the past two decades, evidence has accumulated which 
shows that Amg exerts some of its functions also when the subject is not aware of the nature, 
content or even presence of the triggering emotional stimulus [5]. The present chapter will 
discuss findings related to Amg functions in humans during conditions in which the sub-
ject is not aware of the presence of an emotional visual stimulus. We will cover Amg main 
functional/anatomical afferent and efferent pathways that seem particularly relevant during 
emotion perception in the absence of awareness, and the consequences of such unconscious 
perception along several dimensions, such as expressive or instrumental actions, psycho-
physiological and neuroendocrine alterations or modulation of motivated behaviour. Before 
addressing each specific issue, there are several preliminary considerations, both theoretical 
and methodological, about the relevance of studying Amg’s contribution to emotion process-
ing without awareness [5, 6].
First, Amg functions and circuitry have been well preserved across evolution and appeared 
early during phylogenetic as well as ontogenetic development. For example, the Amg is pres-
ent in reptiles, birds and mammals [1], and its neurogenesis in humans and other primates is 
complete at birth [7], and its connections lay down by the second week of age [8]. Therefore, 
studying Amg’s role in the perception of emotional stimuli when visual awareness is lacking 
enables us to focus on processes related to basic or core aspects of emotion perception and 
responses. These primitive aspects of emotion processing likely evolved before more sophis-
ticated functions like perceptual awareness and core feelings. These primordial Amg func-
tions have been implicated in the specialization of more recent cortical functions across the 
primate lineage as well as during development and maturation [9], including present-day 
organization of the cortical visual system [10, 11]. Hence, this also provides a valuable testing 
ground for gauging cross-species continuity of functions and comparison. Second, by exam-
ining stimulus properties and categories that evoke Amg activity without awareness, or that 
by comparison fail to do so, we may be able to abstract from common taxonomies, such as 
those distinguishing animate from inanimate objects, faces from bodies and so on, to reveal 
cross-category commonalities between stimulus types and attributes that could not be antici-
pated by looking at cortical segregation of stimulus categories [12, 13]. Lastly, Amg clearly 
rests at the intersection between conscious as well as non-conscious emotional processing 
[14]. To the extent that these two different modes of processing incoming sensory informa-
tion co-exist in the brain, assessing which operations the Amg undertakes without awareness 
helps to unravel functions that may be overridden, modulated or even actively blocked dur-
ing conscious perception and cortical top-down regulation. This can add valuable insights to 
the longstanding debate on whether perceptions with and without awareness are qualitative 
or quantitatively different phenomena, whether and how they interact and interfere to shape 
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the ultimately conscious representation of the external world, and which are, if anything, the 
specific evolutionary benefits that determined conservation of emotion processing without 
awareness across evolution [6].
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. We will first introduce a conceptual and termino-
logical distinction between different types of emotion perceptions without awareness, as they 
entail profoundly different mechanisms and are sampled through distinctive experimental 
designs. Second, we will review neuroimaging evidences demonstrating Amg activity during 
emotion perception without awareness, how they have been interpreted, and current contro-
versies and limitations. Third, we will discuss the neural timing of the Amg response during 
presence/absence of visual awareness for the triggering emotional stimulus, and how data 
acquired with high temporal resolution techniques can elucidate and accommodate apparent 
inconsistencies originating from fMRI results. Fourth, we will consider functional and anatom-
ical evidence about the neural networks that seem crucial in conveying sensory information 
to the Amg in the absence of awareness. Fifth, we will concentrate on stimulus categories and 
properties that can be processed non-consciously by the Amg and finally, we will summarize 
the behavioural and psychophysiological consequence of emotion perception without aware-
ness. Throughout the chapter, we will concentrate on vision because this is the best-known 
system in terms of connections with the Amg in human and non-human primates, and because 
the majority of human studies investigating Amg’s role in processing emotions without aware-
ness used visual stimuli.
2. Different types of unawareness for emotions and how they are studied
A host of techniques and experimental manipulations have been used to render emotional 
stimuli not consciously perceivable. For example, during backward masking an emotional 
stimulus (e.g. a facial expression) is briefly presented and then immediately followed by 
a masking stimulus (e.g. a neutral or scrambled face). If the stimulus onset asynchrony 
between the first and masking stimulus is sufficiently brief, then the observer cannot con-
sciously report the presence or the emotional content of the first stimulus [15, 16]. Binocular 
rivalry or continuous flash suppression exploits the mutual inhibition between monocular 
channels in the primary visual cortex (V1) by presenting different images to the correspond-
ing regions of the two eyes [17–19]. In such condition, only one image enters visual aware-
ness, whereas the other image is suppressed from awareness. Other popular paradigms 
include dual-task designs where the subject’s attention is engaged in an attention-absorbing 
task, such as matching judgment between neutral stimuli, while an emotional stimulus is 
presented at task-irrelevant and unattended locations [20, 21]. In the attentional blink, a rapid 
stream of stimuli is presented and subjects are asked to detect the presence of a target stimu-
lus. However, if a second target appears in rapid succession after a first successfully detected 
target (typically within 500 ms), the latter fails to be reported [22]. Many other paradigms 
such as priming, Stroop-task, dot-probe designs or the redundant target paradigm have been 
used to sample emotion perception without awareness, each with its own advantages and 
limitations [23–27].
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Although detailed coverage of these different methods goes beyond the purposes of this 
chapter, they can be conveniently grouped in two broad categories that entail different func-
tional mechanisms [6]. Dual-task, attentional blink, visual search or Stroop paradigms render 
the emotional stimulus not consciously visible by interfering with attentional mechanisms. 
Psychophysical evidence indicates indeed that visual stimuli outside the focus of attention 
are not, or are only partially, seen consciously [28]. Accordingly, when attentional resources 
are engaged in a task, cortical activity that is evoked in visual areas by unattended (i.e. 
task-irrelevant) stimuli is suppressed or significantly reduced by top-down influences from 
fronto-parietal regions that control voluntary attention [29]. We refer to these phenomena as 
attentional unawareness. Emotional stimuli seem to constitute an exception, as the processing 
of emotional information seems less dependent on attentional resources than neutral informa-
tion. As we will discuss later, this mechanism seems to depend on Amg [30].
In contrast, failure to become aware of a stimulus may also result from sensory reasons, 
although attentional selection mechanisms can operate normally [31]. For example, if the 
stimulus intensity is too weak (i.e. below the detection threshold) or the presentation time 
is too brief (i.e. subliminal), the stimulus often does not generate a conscious sensation not-
withstanding we pay attention to it [32, 33]. Backward masking, binocular rivalry or flash 
suppression do not modulate attention, but temporarily interfere with normal functioning 
in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex, which is known to be crucial for visual awareness 
[18, 34, 35]. In this latter case, we refer to this type of non-conscious processing as sensory 
unawareness.
Attentional and sensory unawareness are thus qualitatively different phenomena that can 
be investigated to explore different Amg functions, while still remaining within the domain 
of non-conscious processes. For example, studying emotion perception during attentional 
unawareness is well-suited to examine the role of Amg in biasing orientation towards affec-
tive stimuli, and investigate what mechanism enables Amg to eventually promote privileged 
access of emotional signals to awareness. Sensory unawareness can instead reveal alterna-
tive pathways by which visual stimuli can reach the Amg, or their impact towards on-going 
activities, behaviour or judgments, while still remaining unseen. Lastly, patients with brain 
damage represent an invaluable additional source of information to broaden our knowledge 
of Amg functions without awareness. Patients with hemispatial neglect due to right temporo-
parietal lesions typically fail to pay attention to the contralesional (left) space, and stimuli 
appearing on that side often go undetected [36]. Therefore, the study of Amg response to 
emotional stimuli in such patients can add insights into the mechanism governing attentional 
unawareness. On the other hand, patients with cortical blindness following destruction of 
the visual cortex offer a case study to investigate the distinction between conscious and non-
conscious emotion processing due to sensory causes, as opposed to attentional, and the role 
of Amg therein [37]. Indeed, such patients are permanently blind to stimuli presented inside 
the scotoma (the visual field region affected by the cortical lesion), including supra thresh-
old and long-lasting stimuli [38–41]. Lastly, patients with focal damage to the Amg offer the 
ultimate ground-truth to translate correlational evidence typical of fMRI into causal evidence 
on Amg functions, by observing whether and how the influence of emotional stimuli during 
attentional or sensory unawareness is modified or abolished following Amg lesion [42].
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3. Amygdala response during sensory and attentional unawareness: 
evidence and limits
Neuroimaging studies on healthy participants in which attention was manipulated have 
shown that stimulus-evoked activity in the Amg, along with that of other cortical and sub-
cortical structures, is not suppressed when emotional stimuli are unattended [21, 43–45]. 
Although this has been sometimes interpreted as evidence of strict automaticity in Amg 
response to emotion, the current evidence is mixed on this issue. For example, Vuilleumier 
et al. [21] showed that Amg activation in response to fearful facial expressions is indepen-
dent of attention, whereas Pessoa et al. [20] reported that when attention is engaged else-
where by a demanding task, Amg response is suppressed. These apparently contradictory 
results may be partly explained by differences in the tasks and experimental design, which 
prevent simple or straightforward comparisons. In fact, in the original study by Pessoa and 
collaborators [20], the subjects had to evaluate the gender during trials in which attention 
was focused on the faces, whereas they were asked to judge the same/different orientation 
of peripheral bars when faces were unattended. In addition to the focus of attention on faces 
versus bars, therefore, the cognitive load, type of judgment and task requirements also varied 
between the two conditions, whereas in the study by Vuilleumier et al. [21] only the focus of 
attention changed. Also, Pessoa et al. [20] used a block design, which samples Amg activity 
across various repetitions of the same condition and is thus more liable to habituation and 
less sensitive to physiological responses induced by single events, whereas Vuilleumier et al. 
[21] used an event-related design where attention varied between single trials. Another major 
confounding factor concerns the different response the Amg displays to various emotion cat-
egories. For instance, Williams et al. [45] found that Amg activity in response to happy facial 
expressions was greater when faces were attended, whereas for fearful expressions activity 
was greater when the faces were unattended. Findings collected in neuroimaging studies on 
patients with hemispatial neglect seem more convergent towards the automaticity of Amg’s 
activity in response to unattended stimuli. Indeed, stimuli presented in the contralateral and 
pathologically unattended left side of such patients can activate the Amg as well as cortical 
areas directly connected to it, such as the orbitofrontal cortex or the insula [46–48]. The advan-
tage of addressing the issue of Amg automaticity in neglect patients is based on the fact that 
no explicit or intentional manipulation of attention is required from the subject, thereby dis-
counting issues related to task differences and attentional load between conditions.
Investigations on sensory unawareness have consistently shown that unseen emotional stimuli 
elicit activity in the Amg, often along with activity in the superior colliculus and pulvinar [11, 
16, 17, 19, 49–58]. But how robust is Amg’s response to unseen as opposed to seen stimuli? 
Some reports found indeed that Amg activity during unawareness and awareness is the same, 
others described that in several cases, unseen emotional stimuli yield responses higher than 
those reported during conscious perception of the same stimuli [43, 59], whereas still others 
reported significantly greater activity in Amg when participants were aware of emotional 
expressions [56, 57, 60]. Also in this case, methodological differences seem at least partly 
responsible for the inconsistencies. In fact, assessing the neural bases of emotion perception 
during sensory unawareness ideally involves a direct comparison between perceived and 
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unperceived, albeit physically identical, stimuli. Evidence of this type is, however, difficult to 
observe in healthy individuals, because many manipulations that render a stimulus invisible 
for the subject inevitably also render the stimulus spatially and temporally different from its 
consciously visible counterpart. At present, studies on patients with cortical blindness follow-
ing destruction of the visual cortex possibly provide the best opportunity to clarify the neural 
basis and properties of non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli. These patients are able 
to discriminate emotional stimuli that they report not to have seen, for example by ‘guessing’ 
whether the stimulus expresses happiness or fear [61]—a phenomenon known as affective 
blindsight—and their proficiency is associated with activity in the Amg [61–68]. As it often 
happens when mixed results are reported, interpretations and theoretical views on the role of 
Amg tend to group along two extremes: those endorsing a strict notion on Amg automaticity 
and independency from awareness, and those supporting that awareness is a necessary con-
dition for Amg response to occur. We and others have proposed that neural networks for 
conscious and non-conscious perception of emotions are not entirely different or segregated 
[5, 30, 69–71]. In this context, Amg not only contributes to both modes of processing, but 
its initial response without awareness actually helps to determine whether the stimulus will 
reach awareness and how it will modulate behavioural and bodily reactions. Therefore, the 
temporal dimension of Amg response becomes critical to interpret its role in emotion percep-
tion without awareness, while also offering an additional framework to understand more 
coherently the seemingly abstracted and different findings summarized above [6].
4. Timing of Amg response: fast signals for slow measures
The speed of processing has always been regarded as one hallmark of non-conscious emo-
tion perception [72]. However, human studies on Amg engagement in emotion processing 
without awareness typically used fMRI, which has high spatial but poor temporal resolution. 
In fact, fMRI studies usually average together events occurring during a temporal window of 
about 2 s, due to the sluggishness of blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response. On the 
other hand, non-invasive methods with higher temporal resolution in the order of millisec-
onds, such as EEG and MEG, have traditionally had limitations in sampling neural activity in 
deep structures such as the Amg [73]. Nevertheless, recent technical advancements in sources 
analysis, such as the synthetic aperture magnetometry (SAM) and sliding windows analysis, 
increased precision and sensitivity in detecting MEG signals from deep brain structures.
One early study combining MEG and MRI methods reported early event-related synchroni-
zation in the Amg at 20–30 ms after stimulus onset, whereas synchronization in the primary 
visual cortex occurred later at about 40–50 ms after stimulus onset [74]. A more recent MEG 
study revealed a dissociation between rapid Amg response to automatic fearful face processing 
and a later response that interacted with voluntary attention. On each trial, participants had 
to discriminate the orientation of peripheral bars while task-irrelevant neutral or fearful faces 
were presented centrally. Rapid increase in gamma band activity in response to threatening 
faces (30–60 ms) was shown to be independent of task load and under attentional unaware-
ness, while a significant interaction of emotion with attention manipulation was seen at later 
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latencies (280–340 ms), subsequent to fronto-parietal activity [75]. Coherently, two other MEG 
studies used dynamic causal modelling (DCM) to test the explanatory power of the automatic 
Amg response mediated via the subcortical route versus a model predicting only cortical 
mediation associated with stimulus awareness over Amg activity. Early brain activity was bet-
ter explained by a model including an automatic Amg response via the subcortical pathway, 
whereas at longer latencies both models had comparable explanatory power [76, 77]. Therefore, 
MEG data offer new clues to resolve the longstanding controversy concerning automaticity of 
Amg response based on fMRI results, as described above [78]. On such bases, it seems that Amg 
automaticity is a function of time, and these findings have been interpreted according to a two-
stage model of emotion-attention interaction. Early Amg responses afford early discrimination 
between threat and neutral stimuli. These responses occur independently of awareness and 
attention, possibly because the influence of the fronto-parietal cortex in reducing the repre-
sentation strength of task-irrelevant and unattended emotional information during attentional 
competition requires more time to be effective. Conversely, later Amg responses are modulated 
by attention because the same top-down fronto-parietal mechanisms have had sufficient time to 
enhance the representation of task-relevant and attended information. Notably, both the early 
automatic and later attention-modulated Amg responses lie within the time window of one 
volume acquisition of fMRI studies, likely resulting in the contamination of the rapid effects [6].
Admittedly, intracranial electrophysiological recordings offer the most reliable source of evi-
dence concerning both automaticity of Amg response and its dependency on attention and 
visual awareness. Three recent studies addressed this issue by recording signals directly from 
electrodes implanted in the Amg of patients undergoing pre-surgical assessment of pharma-
cologically intractable epilepsy. Pourtois and colleagues [79] employed the same dual-task 
paradigm previously used by Vuilleumier et al. [21] to gauge Amg automaticity with fMRI 
measures. Recordings from lateral Amg in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy showed an 
early neural response, in the 140–290 ms post-stimulus onset that differed between fearful 
and neutral faces. Notably, this early response occurred independently of, and prior to, atten-
tional effect starting at 700 ms post-stimulus onset. Likewise, Sato et al. [80] showed greater 
gamma-bend activity in response to fear compared to neutral faces between 50 and 150 ms. 
Even though this study confirmed early responses to emotional stimuli, sensory or atten-
tional unawareness was not manipulated and stimuli were projected centrally for 1 s. Lastly, 
a recent study by Ménzed-Bértolo at al. [81] found fast Amg responses at 74 ms post-stimulus 
onset, which were specific for fearful faces compared to neutral or happy facial expressions. 
Moreover, fast Amg responses were selective to the low spatial frequencies’ components of 
fearful faces. This sensitivity to low spatial frequencies is important because it is in keeping 
with the properties of the magnocellular pathway, which is supposed to relay visual signals 
to the Amg via a subcortical pathway devoted to fast and non-conscious emotion perception.
The present findings raise two interrelated issues of the utmost relevance. The first one concerns 
how visual information exploitable for non-conscious emotion perception reaches the Amg. The 
second relates to the encoding properties of the pathway(s) that channel visual information to 
the Amg without awareness, thereby defining which visual properties, stimulus attributes and 
categories can undergo emotion processing and trigger appropriate responses. In the next two 
sections we will deal separately with each of these issues.
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5. Pathways to the Amg relevant for non-conscious emotion perception
The canonical pathway for the transmission of visual information from the retina to the Amg 
passes through the occipito-temporal cortex along the ventral stream, with the main projection 
originating from the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex (TE) [82]. However, earlier 
studies in rats underlined the role of midbrain structures in providing a rapid but coarse analy-
sis of the affective value of auditory as well as visual stimuli and in relaying such information 
to the Amg, hence bypassing the primary sensory cortices [72, 83–87]. Neuroimaging data on 
healthy subjects in which sensory unawareness for emotional stimuli had been induced by 
experimental manipulations have revealed that the superior colliculus, pulvinar and Amg con-
stitute a functional network that shows increased positive covariation of activity in response to 
non-consciously perceived emotional signals [11, 16, 54, 57, 88, 89]. By contrast, the major corti-
cal pathway relaying visual input to the Amg does not show substantial activity and functional 
connectivity under the same conditions of sensory unawareness but does so during conscious 
perception of emotional stimuli [17, 56, 57]. Similar findings have been reported in patients 
with affective blindsight presented with unseen facial and bodily expressions. This indicates 
that a functional subcortical pathway to the Amg is engaged in emotion perception during sen-
sory unawareness [5, 65, 66, 68, 90–94]. The involvement of the superior colliculus and pulvinar 
is in keeping with their connectional pattern and physiological properties. Notably, the super-
ficial layers of the superior colliculus (SC) receive direct retinal input only from the magnocel-
lular and koniocellular channels originating from the parasol and bistratified retinal ganglion 
cells, respectively [95–97]. Also the medial subdivision of the inferior pulvinar receives direct 
projections from the retina, in addition to input originating from the superior colliculus and 
targeting the centromedial and posterior subdivisions of the inferior pulvinar [6]. Hence, these 
subcortical structures are ideally positioned to convey visual input to the Amg and bypass 
transient or permanent inactivation of the visual cortices. The functional role of the superior 
colliculus and pulvinar in processing emotional expressions has also received independent 
support from recent single cell recordings in monkeys [98]. In fact, a subpopulation of neurons 
in the superior colliculus responds to face and face-like visual stimuli, and its response prop-
erties are not influenced by low spatial frequency filtering of the images. Moreover, neural 
response magnitude and latency to face stimuli in the superior colliculus significantly correlate 
with those in the pulvinar. Another cell recording study from the same group showed that 
monkey pulvinar neurons display differential activity to specific emotional expressions [99].
Granted the role of a subcortical functional pathway to the Amg devoted to processing emotion 
under sensory unawareness, are these structures also anatomically connected, thereby form-
ing a structural pathway? While tracer studies have demonstrated the existence in birds and 
rodents of anatomical connections between the superior colliculus, pulvinar and Amg, similar 
evidence in primates was lacking until recently [14, 100]. Yet Day-Brown et al. [101] have shown 
in tree shrews that projections to the lateral Amg originate also from the dorsal pulvinar. This 
latter part of the pulvinar receives visual input from the superior colliculus, thereby forming 
a disynaptic pathway to the Amg. The authors suggested that this pathway potentially relays 
non-topographic visual information from the SC to the Amg, its functional role being that of 
alerting the animal to potentially dangerous signals [101]. In an attempt to verify whether such 
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anatomical connections also exist in the human brain, we used diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) 
and tractography techniques to characterize in vivo the connectivity between the superior col-
liculus, pulvinar and Amg in normal observers and its changes in blindsight GY are the initials 
of the patient’s name that it has been tested in the paper. This way of report the name is to pro-
tect the privacy of the patient [102]. We found fibre connections between pulvinar and Amg and 
also between superior colliculus and Amg via the pulvinar in the healthy observer as well as in 
the patient GY. The destruction of the visual cortex led to qualitative and quantitative modifica-
tions along the pathways connecting these three structures, and the changes were confined to 
the patient’s damaged hemisphere, thereby strongly supporting the notion that the subcortical 
route conveys visual information critical for sustaining affective blindsight and non-conscious 
emotion perception. A recent tractography study by Rafal and collaborators [103] used a differ-
ent tractography method in 20 healthy subjects, as well as in eight monkeys, to trace possible 
direct connections between colliculus, pulvinar and Amg. The results in humans were closely 
comparable to our previous findings, and the study also provided the first anatomical evidence 
of direct connections between Amg, pulvinar and colliculus in the monkey brain.
Clearly, the existence of such a subcortical pathway does not exclude the possibility that the 
Amg receives visual input also from other structures, nor the role of cortical areas in differ-
ent forms of conscious or non-conscious emotion perception [104]. For example, both the 
lateral geniculate nucleus and the pulvinar send collateral projections that bypass V1 and 
target extrastriate visual areas, including areas along the ventral stream that can then relay 
visual information back to the Amg. Also, two other disynaptic subcortical pathways to the 
Amg have been recently demonstrated in mice, along with their functional role in triggering 
innate defensive responses to threatening visual stimuli. Both these pathways originate from 
the superior colliculus, but one includes the parabigeminal nucleus as intermediate station 
leading to the Amg [105], whereas the other involves the lateral posterior nucleus of the 
thalamus [106]. Whether these and other potential pathways beyond the well-documented 
colliculus-pulvinar-Amg one play a crucial role for emotion perception without awareness 
in humans remains to be established. Lastly, these two-route perspective involving cortical 
versus subcortical input to the Amg has been often conceived or presented as alternative to 
the two-stages account discussed above, as emerging from analyses of the temporal profile 
of Amg responses. However, there is no necessary contradiction between these two views 
nor must they be seen as mutually exclusive. Conversely, empirical evidence seems to indi-
cate they co-exist in the intact brain, and they gain new coherence when considered under 
the light of the distinction between sensory and attentional unawareness introduced above 
[6]. In fact, when V1 is not able to process visual information normally, because of either 
experimental manipulation inducing sensory unawareness or permanent damage to V1, the 
subcortical route seems the primary non-canonical pathway to convey rapidly visual infor-
mation to Amg and sustain non-conscious emotion processing. During attentional unaware-
ness in healthy subjects or in patients with neglect, however, the visual cortex is normally 
functioning and coarse magnocellular input can also reach the Amg from cortical areas in 
the ventral stream through an initial forward sweep [30, 71]. This can afford rapid process-
ing of unattended stimuli prior to voluntary attentional control [79, 107] or fine-grained and 
conscious stimulus perception.
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6. Stimulus categories and properties triggering amygdala response 
without awareness
Facial expressions effectively communicate other’s emotions during social interactions and, 
until recently, most investigations of human emotions predominately concentrated on pro-
cesses associated with viewing faces (e.g. Ref. [108]). It is therefore not surprising that research 
on emotion perception without awareness primarily used facial expressions [16, 53, 54, 109]. 
This has contributed to the prevailing assumption that Amg activity during non-conscious 
emotion perception is selective for facial expressions [10, 110]. However, recent investigation 
seems to challenge this view from two parallel lines of findings. On the one hand, Amg activity 
contingent upon sensory and attentional awareness in healthy as well as brain damaged 
patients emerged from non-facial stimuli, thereby extending evidence of non-conscious emo-
tion processing to other stimulus categories. Bodily expressions of emotions, both static and 
dynamic, have been the most extensively studied non-facial stimuli [46, 47, 62, 67, 68, 92–94, 
110, 111]. Stimuli that represent evolution-determined threats, such as spiders and snakes, 
have also been tested under conditions of sensory and attentional unawareness. These stimuli 
induced enhanced physiological arousal and amygdala activity [112–115] particularly in indi-
viduals who were phobic to these types of stimuli, and activated Amg also when unattended 
because they were presented in the affected side of patients with hemispatial neglect [47]. 
On the other hand, the alleged special status of faces in triggering non-conscious perception 
and Amg activity is at odds with negative evidence when non-emotional facial attributes are 
tested, such as personal identity or gender [116]. Furthermore, facial expressions of complex 
social emotions, such as arrogance or guilt, also fail to undergo non-conscious emotion pro-
cessing in patient with affective blindsight (Celeghin, Adenzato, et al., in preparation).
A certain degree of functional similarity between these different stimulus categories, resulting 
in their similar role in sustaining non-conscious emotion processing and Amg response, chal-
lenges theories exclusively concerned with analysis of the specific visual features. In fact, evi-
dence suggests an approach that cuts across gross physical stimulus differences, as there exist 
between facial and bodily expressions, or between these latter and snakes, to focus more on 
the functional properties of visual signals. Under the assumption that the special role of faces 
is not fixed by their physical properties but by their functional ones, the findings reported 
above converge with the idea that non-conscious emotion processing is not specific for faces, 
but rather for biologically primitive emotional signals that can be encoded from low spatial 
frequencies, that are clearly associated with action tendencies and to which we are evolution-
ary prepared to respond [5]. Accordingly, complex affective scenes derived from the interna-
tional affective picture system (IAPS) cannot be processed non-consciously in patients with 
affective blindsight [117] and do not activate Amg under attentional unawareness tested in 
patients with neglect [118].
Evidence therefore suggests that the analysis of the emotional content of complex scenes, 
facial identity or expressions of social emotions may depend critically on conscious visual 
perception and on the detailed processing of the high spatial frequency information that is 
typically performed by the cortical visual system [119]. We have already discussed findings 
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about fast Amg responses for low but not high spatial frequency fearful expressions [81, 120]. 
In an attempt to determine the causal role and behavioural consequences of Amg activity dur-
ing non-conscious perception of low spatial frequencies expressions, we have recently tested 
two patients with affective blindsight in a combined behavioural/fMRI experiment. Fearful 
and neutral faces were filtered so as to contain only low or only high spatial frequency infor-
mation. We reasoned that, if non-conscious emotion perception during sensory unawareness 
relies on a subcortical pathway to Amg and magnocellular channels, then the patients should 
be able to correctly guess the emotional expressions of faces filtered for displaying only low 
spatial frequency information and this behavioural effect should be associated with Amg 
activity. Conversely, the same expressions filtered in high spatial frequency should knock 
out the behavioural effect and Amg response should drop significantly. Preliminary evidence 
indeed confirms our hypothesis and provides direct support for the role of subcortical struc-
tures in mediating affective blindsight.
7. Consequences of Amg activity during non-conscious emotion 
perception
What are the consequences of Amg activity without stimulus awareness? Do they alter on-
going behaviour, psychophysiological reactions or expressive responses towards normally 
seen environmental stimuli? And, lastly, are these responses felt consciously, even though 
they cannot be linked to the external triggering event?
Non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli associated with Amg activity often induce 
behavioural consequences that are accompanied by characteristic psychophysiological cor-
relates of changes in the emotional state of the (unaware) observer. These behavioural and 
psychophysiological outcomes are often different from those associated with conscious per-
ception, as they tend to be stronger and faster in the former case [35, 47, 67]. This suggests 
that non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli is not simply a degraded counterpart of 
conscious perception, but a different mode of processing visual signals.
For example, emotional stimuli that are unattended nevertheless interfere with on-going tasks 
[25, 121], and behavioural consequences include delayed disengagement of attention [122], 
faster and easier detection than neutral stimuli, as shown in visual search [123, 124], atten-
tional blink paradigms [22] or in patients with neglect [35, 125–128]. Notably, damage to the 
Amg abolishes some of these behavioural effects [42]. Likewise, attitudes and preferences 
towards neutral stimuli may be shifted towards more positive or more negative evaluations 
depending on whether the neutral stimuli are preceded by, or paired with, unperceived emo-
tional stimuli [129, 130]. For example, consumption behaviours or preference judgments can 
be influenced by exposure to masked facial expressions, despite subjective feelings remain 
unaltered [131, 132]. Notably, however, when subjects are aware of the presence and nature 
of the emotional stimuli these effects sometimes disappear [130, 133].
Psychophysiological changes that are associated with non-conscious perception of emo-
tional stimuli include enhanced skin conductance [15, 134] increased frequency of eye blink 
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(indicating startle reactions or avoidance) [64], changes in stress hormone levels [135], 
increased pupil dilation [47, 67] and heart rate changes [136]. These changes index arousal 
and their function is to prepare the organism for reacting to impeding and salient events. 
Similarly, undetected emotional stimuli also induce spontaneous facial reactions that reflect 
the affective valence of the stimuli, as recorded using electromyography (EMG) [67, 137]. 
This spontaneous tendency to synchronize our facial expressions with the emotional mean-
ing of other individuals’ expressions is likely to play a part in social  interactions [138].
A different source of evidence on the impact of stimulus processing without awareness comes 
from studies that used indirect manipulations. For example, studies on patients with affective 
blindsight have used indirect methods to investigate possible online interactions between con-
sciously and non-consciously perceived emotions, as well as the influence exerted by the former 
over on-going recognition of seen stimuli [63, 139–141]. A classic example of such indirect meth-
ods is the redundant target paradigm, in which stimuli are presented either singly to the intact 
field or paired simultaneously with another stimulus in the blind field. Typically, reaction times 
(RTs) to the seen stimulus are faster during redundant stimulation than during single presenta-
tion to the intact field. With such method, unimodal (visual/visual) and cross-modal interactions 
(visual/auditory) between consciously and non-consciously perceived emotional stimuli have 
been observed in such patients. For example, presenting a facial expression to the blind field of 
patients with blindsight biases their judgment of the emotional prosody of a sentence fragment 
[90, 117]. For example, a fearful prosody in the voice is perceived as more fearful when it is pre-
sented synchronously with a fearful facial expression in the blind visual field, and this effect is 
associated with enhanced Amg activity. These findings converge with the notion that emotion 
processing with and without stimulus awareness co-exist and interact in the intact brain, though 
they can be dissociated because of focal brain damage or experimental manipulation.
But can the bodily changes and responses triggered by unseen emotional stimuli be themselves 
experienced consciously as feelings? The classical view is that we become aware of such bodily 
responses when linking them to conscious representations of their external (e.g. an angry expres-
sion or a sudden noise) or internal causes (e.g. our thoughts). In fact, some evidence indicates that 
we are unable to report a conscious feeling despite the fact that, at the same time, our behaviour 
reveals the presence of an affective reaction triggered by the exposure to an external stimulus 
of which we are unaware. Despite this, however, it is conceivable that we can become aware of 
our physiological changes without any conscious representation of their underlying causes. This 
seems to be a common situation in clinical conditions such as alexithymia, pathological anxiety or 
depression. Also, one study on patients with affective blindsight has shown that the presentation 
of an unseen stimulus previously paired with an aversive event enhances eye-blink startle reflex, 
and this enhancement corresponded to the reported level of negative emotional feelings [142].
8. Concluding considerations
If emotional stimuli can be processed without awareness, activate the Amg, and still induce 
coherent responses, what role is left for consciousness in emotions? Some clues come from 
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the observation that the responses observed when emotion processing is accompanied 
by awareness are often quantitatively or qualitatively different from those induced by 
unconscious processing. Enhanced influence of non-consciously perceived emotional sig-
nals on physiological or expressive responses is in line with evidence that cortical activity 
and awareness may exert an inhibitory modulation over subcortical areas or automatic 
responses [143–145]. The fact that such inhibition is absent during non-conscious percep-
tion of emotional stimuli could also explain the apparently paradoxical finding that subcor-
tical activity can be enhanced during non-conscious compared to conscious perception of 
emotional stimuli in healthy subjects [43, 58]. Likewise, conscious perception of the eliciting 
stimulus can overrule subjective affective experience in response to an aversely conditioned 
stimulus, and the decoupling between phenomenal affective experience and actual physi-
ological changes is associated with increased activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cor-
tex [129, 142]. These findings contradict the common assumption that emotional feelings 
merely reflect cortical readouts of peripheral and autonomic arousal. Therefore, the added 
value of the conscious perception of emotional stimuli seems primarily that of integrating 
representations of the external and internal world in order to achieve context-dependent 
and higher-order decoupling and flexibility between sensory input and behavioural out-
put. Consciousness also allows control and planning, as well as anticipation of desirable or 
functional responses.
From the opposite vantage point, emotions seem to play a prominent role in the genera-
tion and development of state consciousness. The basic physiological reactions triggered 
by emotional stimuli involve the moment-to-moment mapping of our bodily states and 
interoceptive information crucial for homeostatic regulation. Because homeostatic processes 
provide the sense of invariance that accompanies every subjective experience, they consti-
tute a neurobiological mechanism for the invariance of the sense of self and the continuity 
of our first-person experience of the world [146–148]. On this picture, basic aspects of the 
physiological reactions to emotional stimuli overlap with physiological responses related 
to corrections of homeostatic imbalance and thought to be necessary for the general level 
of consciousness [146, 149, 150]. It is not a coincidence that these emotional responses are 
controlled by neural structures in the brainstem that also control the level of consciousness. 
Accordingly, several scholars consider raw emotional feelings as the precursors or basic 
forms of consciousness, and have rooted it in subcortical processes rather than (only) in 
full-blown subjective cognitions implemented in higher-order cortical structure [145, 149, 
151–153]. In keeping with this perspective, children with total congenital absence of the 
cerebral cortex can nevertheless exhibit appropriate affective responses and feelings can 
be even strengthened [154]. Moreover, direct electrical brain stimulation in subcortical and 
brainstem structures that evoke observable behavioural and physiological reactions associ-
ated with reward and punishment in animals, also induce conscious affective feelings when 
stimulated in humans [145, 153]. Therefore, even when we remain unaware of the external 
determinants of an emotional response, such that the eliciting stimulus does not become a 
content of our conscious visual experience, the chain of physiological reactions it triggers 
nevertheless contributes to modulate our state of vigilance and behaviour, which are consti-
tutive components of our state of consciousness.
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